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Note: Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated· 
to stimulate discussion and critical comment. References in 
publications to Discussion Papers should be cleared with the 
author to protect the tentative character of these papers. 
DEVALUATION: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF IMF'S POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS* 
1. Introductiog 
It is by ncM well understood that the use of the extended facility 
of the fund (EFF) or approval for stand-by loans involve the unoortak.ing of 
cx:rrprehensive progrclJIE of adjustm:mt that "include policies • • • • required to 
correct structural ir.balances ••• ". Even after the Funds' internal review 
of its guidelines on conditionality in March 1979, approval of stand-by 
agreenmits alr.ost always requires severe tightening of expenditures through 
contractionary fiscal and m:netary policy measures such as the in'q:x:>sition 
of ceilings on net government borrad.ng and/or net darestic assets of the 
central bank, or an up.vard adjustrrent of nanina.l. interest rates in those 
cases where rates are fixed by the governrrent. Approval also involves an 
"understanding" with the Fund en exchange rate policy and exchange rate 
arranger,ents. The "understariling" usually inclu5es a substantial devaluation 
of the currency. Devaluation thus becaies part of, a restrictive policy 
package which air.ls at ir,proving the balarce of paynents of the oountry and 
its foreign exchange reserve position. 
The advocacy of the sar,e short-run derrand oriented policy package 
in different co.mtries at different tines has created the belief that under­
lying the policy prescriptions there exists a unifon.-1 Ii lF line of thou<;ht 
arul r.ore il,portantly for our pm:p:>ses here a consistent and unifon-,1 analytical 
110del. A cursm:y review of recent dOClT.ents and rnissicn reports however 
· reveals that often the sar,e policy prescriptions are based en different 
analytical ar~u,ents, sa,e justified and sa,-e not, that cast scr.e doubt on 
the widespread acreptan:::e within the II IF of a particular theoretical 
* Paper presented at the AF.A Annual Meetings held in New York 
City, N. Y. at the session on ''The IMF and Conditionality", on December 
28, 1982. 
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stroctm:e as a guideline for policy. Thus by 1982, as theoretical advances 
in macroecx::oanics am intematiooal finance have cast substantial dalbt en 
the enpirical if oot theoi:etical validity of a sinpliaticm::netary approa::h 
to the balame of payments, the analytical argments that are used to sustain 
the traditiooal policy line have beoare by neoessity murkier am m::>re cu,lber-
sane. 
'1hl.s is nowhere mre clear than in the analysis of exchange rate 
policy which is the focus of this short paper. The use of exchange rate 
adjustnent as an active policy tool is critically analysed in the following 
~ sectioos in texms of its effecti.veness as a stabillzati.oo policy· tool and 
a substitute far tax or redi.stributioo policy. '!he role of exchange rate 
policy in devel.cprent is briefly disClEsed in the last sectioo. 
2. T~ts for Excharl__Si§~te Poli9!' and Macroecxnanic Mjustrrent 
One of the fundar.ental prqx:>sitioos of the macroecx:nanic literatw:e 
pertaining to assigment of policy tools to targets of policy is that, in 
the absence of uncertainty, tools should be assigned to the target whidl 
~ relatively affect the nost. 'lhus for exarrple, in the traditiooal. · 
analysis m::netary policy is assigned to the attaimlent of external balance 
am fiscal policy to that of intemal balance. 
The use and assigment of exchange rate policy revolves around 
' 
the qoostioo of its relative effectiveness as a tool to inprove the balance 
of payments as against a tool that sinply translates the forei311 exchange 
'-
prioe of traded goods to darestic prices or vice versa. 'l'his realization 
serves to highlight the fundatrental distinctioo between using the .- rmina.1 
exchange rate as an active instnlnent of extenlal balance versus a tool 
that insulates the darestic eoax:my fran external goods-ma.l'.ket dis~. 
It is by IlOW' widely a~ that the assigment of the exchange rate to one 
of these targets depends oo the structural characteristics of the eccnauy in 
questioo. 
Whether or oot IX:minal exchange rate devaluation improves the 
o.u:rent aCCX>Unt depends oo two channels through which it might have an 
effect: devaluatioo of .the real exchange rate a:r···a d1reat effect on datestic 
absorpt.ioo. 
The traditional Polak nodel (1957) and nore recently the expositicn 
.. in IMF (1977) and Khan and Knight (1981) that sketch the so-called IMF nodel 
depend oo the latter c:hann:l. In this class of nodels (a) all goods and assets 
are assuned to be perfect substitut.es so that there is in essence one carposite 
good whose price is given, (b) the oountry is a price taker in both goods 
and asset narkets, and (c) all wages arii prices axe flexible so that output 
is fixed at its full-e11¥>].oynent level. 
Given these asswptioos a deva.luaticn woJ:ks solely through a real­
balance effect. The increase in the price of foreign exchange, i:edu:::es real 
balances. Since the denan1 far naiey, the ooly asset available, is exogenously 
det:enn:i.ned the excess dsnand for naiey is translated into a reduction in 
absorpt.icn and a balance of paynents sw:plus which is the vehicle by which 
•· m:ney balances are replenished. 'lbm in this nodel "exchange-rate policy is 
mally policy to manipulate the level of reserves, not the current accamt 
balance" (Branscn, 1982). 
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There is oo J:OCJn in this me good IIDdel for changes in relative 
prices, in:provement of trade c::atpetitiveness or any i:elated considerations. 
If anything, in this traditiaial IlO'letaJ:y m:xlel the exchange rate affects 
the d:I~stic price level while the level of real noney balances affects the 
external balance. 
EVeI1 if ooe stays within this broad franework, added ccnsiclerations 
might mitigat£ the positive effects of the exchange-rate change oo the level 
of J:eSerVes at least in the short-nri. If prices are fl.exil)le an:1 the ecx:ncr.ty 
very q:ien a devaluaticn can give rise to inflaticnazy expectaticns that lead 
to an increase in cxmsUiption and in-ports especially of durables or an accurm.i­
laticn of inventories (D.:>mbusch 1982) • Thus absorptioo might not be rea.~a 
as eJq?eCted in the short run. Mo:te importantly in tenns of its usefulness 
as a policy tool in the case of countries whidi have serious balance of payments 
proolsns, devaluation in teDns of this analytical framework is at best a tool 
that validates past na1etaJ:y expansioo. If the IXr.linal m:riey stock oould be 
restricted to its past level through tight policy, then devaluaticn wa.ild 
becx::ne unnecessazy. 
Finally as IX>ted by Branson (1982) if a cx:runtry faces exogenous flu­
ctuations in interest mtes or real output, m::netai:y policy should be assigred 
to the maintenance of datestic price stability by offseting the induood changes 
in the demand for real n-ooey balances. If disturbances originate in the foreign­
~ markets then darestic price stability could be achieved through an off-. 
setting m:,ve of the ix:minal exchange rate either Via the maJ:ket if the rate is 
floating or through direct policy interventiai. Thus, in the ocntext of the 
sin'ple IlDletaJ:y versioo of the DF m:xlel. the opt:ina.l exchange rate adjustr:ent 
depends oo the source of the distmbance both in teDts of markets and locaticn. 
This is of oourse a ~11 known result f:ran the lit.eratm:e but ooe \>trldl is 
often dismgarded in actual policy prescripticns especially in the rontext 
of IDC' s which face exi:ernal distw:bances in gcxx1s narkets. 
An altogether different channel by which exchange rate adjustr.ent 
influences the current account is thro\,JJh its influence on a relative price 
often called the real exchange rate. The real exchange rate is equivalent either 
to the teims of traae in the ccntext of a siripl.e traae m:x9el with 0-10 
countries that~ cnapl.etely specialize•·" in productioo, or to the relative 
price of traded to oon-traded goods in the case of a snall cour.t cy o,,o-gcxxl. 
nodel. It has been shCMil that there are substantial differences 1:oth in the 
theoretical and enpirical properties of the two indices (Katseli, 1982b). 
Increased caapetitiveness is asscx:::iated either with a ceterioraticn 
in the ten-.-15 of trade which increases the e>qX>rt shal:e of the countcy in t..'ie 
world IrlcUket and :reduces the quantity ir.ported or with an increase in the price 
":the 
of/traded good sector. The story gets more cxnplicated in the nore realistic 
case of a country which is not a price take:r in both or either markets but 
which also produ:es oon-traded goods (Katseli, 1982b). 
In nx:>st IMF reports it is autcr.iatically assuned that a naninal 
devaluatioo will increase a:mpetitiveness by affecting the real exchange rate. 
It is evicent that substantial effort has been recently cevoted to prq:,er 
rreasurer.ents of the real exchange rate especially in countries with diversified 
'trace leading to the presentatioo of alternative indices of real overvaluatiai 
of the currency. The cq:propriate choice of base period, of weights (il:p:lrt, 
export, total trade or sare cx:mbinaticn of 1-ER-1 weights) and of the cb'restic 
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and foreign price iooex to be used (woolesale price Wioes, unit labor 
costs etc) beocme the object of llU1Ch discussioo aoo guarded analysis in 
of missim reports. 1be c:h:>ioe of the relevant oountries also~
becates critical with a grcMing pi:eference t.cMards incusicn of countries 
which cx:tq?ete with the host country in third nm:kets rather than of the 
bilateral trading part:mrs. Both the choice of countries and ~ights 
depends al the question that is being p:,sed. 
Tedmical questions apart, what is rarely seriously discussed in 
n99=>tiations or in written reports is the potential effectiveness of t.11e no­
minal exchange rate oo the real exchange rate. This is so at a tine when 
the theoretical literature abounds with exanples of oases where the structure 
of the eooncmy is such that the real exchange rate is not affected by na.ti.nal 
exchange rate rrovarents and a devaluatial is thought to have negative effects 
ai both output and the price level. (Cooper, 1971, Krugman and 'raylor, 1978, - "" 
'l'aylor, 1979, .Katseli, 1982a). 
Two ext-..n:£e e..xar,IplPs IDight be sufficient to der:onstrate how the 
stnx::ture of the ecx>rany might be such that a nauinal devaluation will have 
m effects al the real rate. S\JEP'.)Se that we consider a less develq:>ed 
oountry that inparts intemediate gc:icx]s to be used in darestic productirn 
unaer fixed coefficients and eJq?Orts agricultural goods or raw rraterials whose 
Sl.JR)ly is inelastic in the short run. This sil:plificatim might be pertinent 
' far a country like Madagascar, the Sudan or even Kenya all of ~ch have 
negotiated stand-by agreerents with the IMF. 'Ihus in this case both the 
· supply elasticity for exports and deuand elasticity far iliports approadl zero. 
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A devaluation will not affect the term of trade and the effect on 
the balance of trade will depend on the initial trade balance. C'iven 
a large initial deficit the exchange rate adjustment will ..gnify 
it. '!be quantity exported llight even be reduced if interaediate imports 
are used in the export sector leading to even a,re perverse effects. '!be 
increase in the <X>St of pi:odu:ticn of ncn-tracled gocx:1s might also prevent 
the expected increase in the ml.ative price of traded to ncn-traaed goods anc 
lead to intemal stagflatim depeixling on the relative elasticities {Katseli, 
Uta.z.) . · Thus in the presence of inteimediate inp:)rts the argurent that 
devaluaticn is a useful tool for praroting cx:npetitiveness beoares at 
best uncertain as profitability is 1npail:ed through the increase in the 
cost of productioo while the tenns of trade are not seriously affected. 
These consideratioos are especially ilrp:>rtant far sane of the sraller U:C's 
whidl do oot have large ir.:port carpeting sectors and have structums of 
trade which are ix,t much different £ran those in the exanple above. 
Even in the absence of inteinediate goods full naninal wage 
indexation is sufficient to pxevent a change in the relative prioe of traded 
to IXln-traded goods. This is a \tell-krx:Jwn case in the literatum developed 
am:ng other aut:h:>rs recently by · Bruno,11978), sadlS · (1980) and 
J.larstai (1982). If rnninal wages are tied to the <X1'lSl.Eer price index, then 
a devaluation will increase ncm1nal wages and the price of oon traded gc:xx1s 
. J-. 
by the full -anount:of the devaluatiai.The moent srpiasis oo the suwly 
• side has thus shifted the focus of di.scussim of the iq>licatims of exdlange 
rate adjusbnent fran dsuand tx:Mards the cost of prcx:bctioo. The shift in 
Ell{ilasis has~ a seri0\.5 questiaung of the effectiveness of rx:minal 
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exchange rate adjustment cm the cun:ent accamt and its mle in macro­
eo::-,xmj r: adjustJDent. 'l'his theoi:etical questialing is still q,en to enpi­
rical testing but it fair to~ that its powerful. and CDltmversial 
aessages have mt yet been adequately .incol:porated into IMF thinking. 
While the role of the exchange rate in aero-adjustment is debated 
thJ:ee additiooal. roles for exchange rate policy have anerged. 'lhese include 
its slbstitut:e role as tax policy esped.ally in the CD1text of I.OC's, its 
role in ina:me J:edistributiai and finally its role in investment pca,otioo. 
and develqment in general. 
3. Altemative a:>les far Exc:haD;je Rate Polig 
For a IDDinal devaluatioo. to ~ the cm:rent aoooont tlu:ou;h 
mdootioo. in absorptiai and/or a change in mlative prices, the cblestic 
prioe of traded goods arx1 the general prioe level lillSt 1ncrease. If cbnestic 
prices m:e fiJaed by .the govemrent thi~ channel of adjustnent is bl.odced. 
In that case, as the c;pven'lllent sells goods at a world market prioe whi.dl is 
higher than the producer prioe it pays, exchange rate policy becxmes a sli>­
stitute for tax policy. A devaluatiai of the curnmcy sillply increases 
export pn>oeeds and sexves the f\mctiai of an elCpOrt tax. Altematively, 
a policy to raise daDestic producer prices to the world market 
level and to devalue by the same 811W:Ult incJ:eases the export tax in absolute 
value (depending ai the &qlply elasticity) and provides incentives for 
export producticn. This was in fact the analytical basis of the IMF's pro­
p:,sal far devaluatial in the cxntext of negotiatiam with acme East.em 
African ex>mtries and this xeascl'ling cnoe again had little to co with caxpe­
titiveness CX'llSideratials. '1be c:i>jective hem was to increase the 
quantity uporl:ed but mint.Bin budget i:evenues as far as p:issible. 'lbis 
use of exchange ratJe policy as tax policy be<XllleS espeMaJJy zelevant 
far oomtties which export few agricultural cuu,bdities er raw mat.erials 
that m:e tnmd by the central ~t and which lack the tax base 
for an effect!ve inoclle tax policy. Devaluatien is thus linked to price 
libemlizatien and efforts to mitigate the \DRllTmlted effects :i:esulting 
fl:an the correctien of mnestic mlative price distarti<XlS. 
ibeze am prci:,lella 1¥:Mever with this approach as well. 
Gi.~ the fact that devaluatien affects iDpart prices and specifi­
cally the prices of iq.ac ted inputs, the effectiveness of the policy padcage 
critically depends en the profitability of the export sector. As it was 
discussed earlier, it is the effective protectien rather than naninal pro­
tectiai that matters and taxatien of irp1tS J:eChx,es profitability; so &:Jes 
the increase in labor oosts that arises in an indexed ecaoey. 
It should be pointed out that a devaluatiai also increases the hale 
curxency value of intemst payments en pd>lic external debt,, making imclear 
the net effect en gtM!lment expenditm:es. 
M:>J:e inp:>rtantly the existence of a marketing board usually gives
'a cnnt.ty sane DBJ:ket power that is not attainable if trade is ~dertaken 
by many small c:x:upetitive prod\D!rs. If that is the case then the CX>a'ltry 
is •aemi.-sma11• 'and a devaluatien that· is i,~tia}al. to the increase #,n 
4. d:Eestic procb::er prices will deteriorate the teims of trade and might lead 
to a possible mducticn in t.ax mvenue and net mq:,ort maupts. 
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Exdwige rate devaluatial has also been th:Juljlt of as a stimulus 
to private saving dlle to the expected mdistributiw effect frail wages 
to profits ie to a aect:or Wlic:h is assanad to be c:hal:act:eri22d by a higher 
marginal. pi:qer111ity to uve. !his line of at:g\m!nt 11fflic:h is illpllc1.t in 
· 8C1Ie of the earlier IMF doalDents has been criticf.zed at many .different 
grands. (Diaz Alejandro/1963) • Putting aside the fact that the narginal 
propensity to save am:ng profit em:ners is not necessarily higher than 
am:ng wage eamers, an 1ncr:ease in the profitability of the traded good 
sector critically depends cm the ensuing 1ncxease in the CX>St of raw ma­
terials and labor as well as cm the c:xuJt:J:y's :r:elative degree of nm:ket 
power (Ahl\arlalia and Lysy_, 1981) •. 
In tel1I& of the earlier discussiai ai mcroeoaani.c adjustment 
a necessary amdi.tiai for ndl.stributiai is that the :telative price of 
traded to nai-traded goods changes. In that case a devaluation will benefit 
toose factors of productiai that a:r:e intensively used in the producticm of 
traded goods and the cxmsuneJ:S of ncn traded goods. In the case of a cnmtJ:1 
which plDducles and exports pr1maey products as is the case of mmiy UX::'s, 
the main beneficiaries of the devaluatiai will pnilably be the export 
a:q.,--gnMers in so far as danestic exp:>rt prices a:r:e al1'Med to increase. 
'lhese amsideratiais highlight the role of exdlange rate policy in 
the cxntext of an overall develq:uent strategy. It can be argued that if 
the ci>jective is to praIDte invest:nent am industrial.i7.atiai the pc8Sible. 
short run benefits on the bl!ll.aooe of payments brought about by exchange 
rate devalmtiai soould be weighed against possible ~run CX>Sts. 
Given the ilq;>ortance of .iJlp>rt:ed capital goods at initial stages of develq>­
ment the:r:e Dlic#lt be a role for JD!lintaining a slightly 0'.1erValued currency 
for 9Cllle penods of time, eapec:ially if the intm:nal tax and txansfer 
system is not adaquately develq)ed. 'lhis strategy ws ac:q,ted at sate 
early piases in the de'Jlelopll!nt of Japan and SClle of the wly 1ndust.riall7.ed 
CXJUntries and its merits lllx>uld be judged in light of the structural chara­
cteristics of the e<XXal!i' in qaestiai. 
ltlie ·.iJlp:>rtantly stabillzatiai policy should not be viewed as a 
sdJstitut.e to develcpDent policy. It is often the case that a:nstraints 
in develq'flent., sbcti as fm:eign exchange availability or insufficient do­
mestic saving, m:e perceived by internatiooal. Ctedit organizations as the 
targets of policy. It is mt clear l1tiy a developing c::x:ultl:y shJuld thrive 
to zeduoe the deficit in its cun:ent accnmt ar what the criteria should 
be far _cbing so. It is clear however that there sha1ld be a laig-run steady-­
state path that policy sboold be a1minJ far dependiffJ .on a a,untry' s level 
of develquent, but such CXXlSideratiCXlS have not yet been seriously addressed 
by the IMF. In a; develqmmt CXlltext the focus should shift fran the cuc:en· 
accol'llt to the basic balance llbem the mquiJ:ed net laig-teJ:m capital inflcw 
f:n,.. dev-=o-1q:m:ent req11i "ea a 0..!!.'!.9!lt acc:,cp.:nt ~-Ficit, that is S'.lp"""~~ b<,1 
an appu.pr.L,.te real exchange rate. In that fnmewol:k the equilibriun ma1 
exchange rate is detemined by lcng-rm grc:Jl,7tfl and- invest:nent prospects 
and ronina1 exchange rate policy is adjusted aotm'dingly. It is thus inpera­
tive not ally to mocnsider the short-run effectiveness of macro-adjusment 
policy in light of new theomtical and enpirical kmwledge but also to place 
stabilizatiai policy in a dynmlic cxntext. 
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